USED-VARIOUS AMOUNTS OF WEAR-POSSIBLE HIGHLIGHTS-WE CANNOT GUARANTEE SUPPLEMENTS SUCH AS CD, ACCESS CODE, OR INFO TRAC.

USED-VARIOUS AMOUNTS OF WEAR-POSSIBLE HIGHLIGHTS-WE CANNOT GUARANTEE SUPPLEMENTS SUCH AS CD, ACCESS CODE, OR INFO TRAC.

24 cm. xvi, 464, illus., bookplate, DJ slightly worn and soiled, erasure on

24 cm. xvi, 464, illus., bookplate, DJ slightly worn and soiled, erasure on front endpaper. David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, and a professor of political science. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into six languages. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals. Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986, Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). He received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his Ph.D. in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University. This magisterial history throws light on Soviet policy on atomic energy at the height of the Cold War, illuminating a central but hitherto secret element of the Stalinist system. 'Stalin and the Bomb' represents a comprehensive history of Soviet nuclear policy, from developments in physics in the 1920s to the emergence of nuclear deterrence in the 1950s. The author looks at how the bombs were built, and the role that espionage played. Based on Kirkus review: Using interviews with some of the main protagonists, such as Kapitsa and Sakharov, and access to those archives that have become available in Russia, Holloway addresses a number of issues. He confirms that the Soviets were dependent on spying to understand British how the British and the Americans were pursuing nuclear weapons, and guidelines to their methods. The building of the hydrogen bomb was largely an indigenous Soviet achievement. Little credit seems due to Stalin, who was responsible for shooting many of the top physicists during the purges and who understood the significance of nuclear weapons only after the explosion at Alamogordo. Holloway concludes that Stalin's refusal to be browbeaten made the US more cautious about asserting its nuclear monopoly. What could have been a dry technical and analytical study is enlivened by the immensity of the issues at stake and the extraordinary characters populating the story.

24 cm. xvi, 464 pages. Illustrations. Illustration Sources. List of

24 cm. xvi, 464 pages. Illustrations. Illustration Sources. List of Abbreviations. Bibliographical Note. Notes. Biographical Notes. Index. DJ has some tears, wear and soiling. Signed with sentiment by author on fep. David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, and a professor of political science. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into six languages. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals. Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986, Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). He received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his Ph.D. in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University. For forty years the Soviet-American nuclear arms race dominated world politics, yet the Soviet nuclear establishment was shrouded in secrecy. Now that the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union has collapsed, it is possible to answer questions that have intrigued policymakers and the public for years. How did the Soviet Union build its atomic and hydrogen bombs? What role did espionage play? How did the American atomic monopoly affect Stalin's foreign policy? What was the relationship between Soviet nuclear scientists and the country's political leaders? This spellbinding book answers these questions by tracing the history of Soviet nuclear policy from developments in physics in the 1920s to the testing of the hydrogen bomb and the emergence of nuclear deterrence in the mid-1950s. In engrossing detail, David Holloway tells how Stalin launched a crash atomic program only after the Americans bombed Hiroshima and showed that the bomb could be built; how the information handed over to the Soviets by Klaus Fuchs helped in the creation of their first bomb; how the scientific intelligentsia, which included such men as Andrei Sakharov, interacted with the police apparatus headed by the suspicious and menacing Lavrentii Beria; what steps Stalin took to counter U.S. atomic diplomacy; how the nuclear project saved Soviet physics and enabled it to survive as an island of intellectual autonomy in a totalitarian society; and what happened when, after Stalin's death, Soviet scientists argued that a nuclear war might extinguish all life on earth. This magisterial history throws light on Soviet policy on atomic energy at the height of the Cold War, illuminating a central but hitherto secret element of the Stalinist system. 'Stalin and the Bomb' represents a comprehensive history of Soviet nuclear policy, from developments in physics in the 1920s to the emergence of nuclear deterrence in the 1950s. The author looks at how the bombs were built, and the role that espionage played. Based on Kirkus review: Using interviews with some of the main protagonists, such as Kapitsa and Sakharov, and access to those archives that have become available in Russia, Holloway addresses a number of issues. He confirms that the Soviets were dependent on spying to understand British how the British and the Americans were pursuing nuclear weapons, and guidelines to their methods. The building of the hydrogen bomb was largely an indigenous Soviet achievement. Little...