This is a used book. It may contain highlighting/underlining and/or the book

This is a used book. It may contain highlighting/underlining and/or the book may show heavier signs of wear. It may also be ex-library or without dustjacket. This is a used book. It may contain highlighting/underlining and/or the book may show heavier signs of wear. It may also be ex-library or without dustjacket.

Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include

Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include companion materials, and may have some shelf wear or limited writing. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority!

Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used textbooks may not

Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have some wear or writing/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority!

8 X 0.87 X 5.31 inches; 432 pages; minor markings in the margins on about 30%

8 X 0.87 X 5.31 inches; 432 pages; minor markings in the margins on about 30% of pages. Some underlining. Minor creasing on spine. Minor fading on the covers. Light yellowing on pages. Good condition otherwise. No other noteworthy defects.; -Your satisfaction is our priority. We offer free returns and respond promptly to all inquiries. Your item will be packaged with care and ship on the same or next business day. Buy with confidence.

The format is approximately 8" x 5.25". xi, [5], 432 pages. Footnotes.

The format is approximately 8" x 5.25". xi, [5], 432 pages. Footnotes. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Ink marks and comments. When Strategies of Containment was published, the Soviet Union was a superpower, Ronald Reagan was president of the United States, and the Berlin Wall was still standing. Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's postwar plans, Gaddis provides a thorough critical analysis of George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look, " the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente, and now a comprehensive assessment of how Reagan--and Gorbachev--completed the process of containment, thereby bringing the Cold War to an end. He concludes, provocatively, that Reagan more effectively than any other Cold War president drew upon the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. A must-read for anyone interested in Cold War history, grand strategy, and the origins of the post-Cold War world. John Lewis Gaddis (born April 2, 1941) is an American Cold War historian, political scientist, and writer. He is the Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University. He is best known for his work on the Cold War and grand strategy, and he has been hailed as the "Dean of Cold War Historians" by The New York Times. Gaddis is also the official biographer of the prominent 20th-century American diplomat and historian George F. Kennan. George F. Kennan: An American Life (2011), which won the 2012 Pulitzer Prize for Biography or Autobiography. Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis's book Strategies of Containment offers a detailed and nuanced analysis of the guiding strategies animating American foreign policy from Truman to Nixon. Beginning with the world situation in 1945, Gaddis explains how the diplomatic means of containment slowly outgrew its original mandate to become the end of American foreign policy. And, while its apology for Kissinger's Machiavellian "realism" at the end definitely rubbed me the wrong way, I still found the book illuminating and informative in its discussion of the often complex and turbulent relationship between ideas and process. According to Gaddis, containment emerged "as a series of attempts to deal with the consequences of [the] World War II Faustian bargain" between the Soviet Union and the US. Although Kennan didn't coin the term until 1947, Gaddis argues, the problem of containing Russia hung like a sword of Damocles over the entire war effort, particularly since Roosevelt--needing Soviet troops to fight so that the US could primarily remain the "arsenal of Democracy" rather than its army--could ill afford to antagonize the Russians too deeply. As such, Roosevelt "sought to ensure a stable postwar order by offering Moscow a prominent place in it; by making it, so to speak, a member of the club. The assumption here--and it is a critical one for understanding Roosevelt's policy--was that Soviet hostility stemmed from insecurity, but that the sources of that insecurity were external." FDR believed that "integrating the Soviet Union into a postwar security structure" by making it one of the "Four Policemen" (with the US, England, and China) would hone the rough edges off of Soviet policy while creating a system by which its territorial ambitions could be countered. Although Roosevelt's plan of integrating Russia into the postwar community failed--in part because even FDR's considerable personal charm couldn't crack the tough nut of Stalin--such a policy remained the goal of US foreign policy until George Kennan composed his "long telegram" of February 1946. As Gaddis puts it, the "thesis of Kennan's 'long telegram' was nothing less than that the whole basis of American policy toward the Soviet Union during and after World War II had been wrong." Kennan argued that the source of Russian insecurity wasn't external-it was internal and could not be...