Incentives and Political Economy
- Binding: Hardcover
- Publisher: Oxford University Press
- Publish date: 06/15/2000
Description:
Laffont here constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using recent developments in contract theory. He treats poetical economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of economic policy to self-interested politicians. Treating politicians successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers, he characterizes the optimal constitutional responses to the activities of interest groups in various circumstances, as well as the optimal trade-off between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas.
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