Our experience in Vietnam was a debacle, according to author Anthony James Joes, but profoundly atypical of America's overall experience with guerrilla warfare. He examines several twentieth-century conflicts that should have better prepared the country for Vietnam: the Philippines in 1898, Nicaragua in the 1920s, Greece in the late 1940s, and the Philippines again during the Huk War of 1945-52. In a controversial interpretation, he suggests that valuable lessons were forgotten or ignored in Southeast Asia. Later, during the long Salvadoran conflict of the 1980s, American leaders seemed to recall what they had learned.

Joes presents a total of nine case studies, from the role of Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox, in driving Cornwallis to Yorktown and eventual surrender to the U.S. support of Afghan rebels that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Empire. He analyzes the origins of each conflict, traces American involvement, and seeks patterns and deviations. Studying numerous campaigns, including ones staged by Confederate units during the Civil War, Joes suggests the combination of elements that can lead a nation to success in guerrilla warfare or doom it to failure.

As America faces recurring crises in the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, and possibly Asia, a comprehensive analysis of past experiences is essential for today's policymakers.