In Defense of a Political Court
- List Price: $51.00
- Binding: Paperback
- Publisher: Princeton Univ Pr
- Publish date: 10/01/2001
Peretti asserts that politically motivated constitutional decisionmaking is not only inevitable, it is legitimate and desirable as well. When Supreme Court justices decide in accordance with their ideological values, or consider the likely political reaction to the Court's decisions, a number of benefits result. The Court's performance of political representation and consensus-building functions is enhanced, and the effectiveness of political checks on the Court is increased. Thus, political motive in constitutional decisionmaking does not lead to judicial tyranny, as many claim, but goes far to prevent it. Using pluralist theory, Peretti further argues that a political Court possesses instrumental value in American democracy. As one of many diverse and redundant political institutions, the Court enhances both system stability and the quality of policymaking, particularly regarding the breadth of interests represented.
By using considerable empirical evidence, Peretti makes a provocative normative argument and bridges the gap between normative constitutional theorists and political scientists who study the courts.
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