Description: A successful organization must coordinate the activities of its constituent parts. Effective coordination is problematic when the components of the organization are managed by individuals whose primary concern is personal gain, not the success of the institution. However, if everyone is motivated by narrow self-interest, the pursuit of self-interest will be self-defeating unless individual decisions are made under incentives that foster the organization's goals. This book studies incentive environments, and evaluates the resulting performance of a wide range of institutions. It also investigates the extent to which performance can be improved by modifying the incentives. Professor Campbell's treatment of the economics of information, mechanism design, and game theory from the standpoint of incentives can be followed by anyone with a basic knowledge of single-variable calculus and intermediate microeconomic theory. Readers learn the principles by working through examples, and not by digesting proofs of general theorems. Upper-level undergraduates and master's-level students will find the material particularly useful, as will Ph.D. students seeking a better grasp of theoretical principles through worked examples.

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