Description: Part I: INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING Introduction to Part I 1. Preference and Choice A. Introduction B. Preference Relations C. Choice Rules D. The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice Rules Exercises 2. Consumer Choice A. Introduction B. Commodities C. The Consumption Set D. Competitive Budgets E. Demand Functions and Comparartive Statics F. The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Law of Demand Exercises 3. Classical Demand Theory A. Introduction B. Preference Relations: Basic Properties C. Preference and Utility D. The Utility Maximization Problem E. The Expenditure Minimization Problem F. Duality: A Mathematical Introduction G. Relationships between Demand, Indirect Utility, and Expenditure Functions H. Integrability I. Welfare Evaluation of Economic Changes J. The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference Appendix: Continuity and Differentiability Properties of Walrasian Demand Exercises 4. Aggregate Demand A. Introduction B. Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Wealth C. Aggregate Demand and the Weak Axiom D. Aggregate Demand and the Existence of a Representative Consumer Appendix: Regularizing Effects of Aggregation Exercises 5. Production A. Introduction B. Production Sets C. Profit Maximization and Cost Minimization D. The Geometry of Cost and Supply in the Single Output Case E. Aggregation F. Efficient Production G. Remarks on the Objectives of the Firm Appendix: The Linear Activity Model Exercises 6. Choice under Uncertainty A. Introduction B. Expected Utility Theory C. Money Lotteries and Risk Aversion D. Comparison of Payoff Distributions in Terms of Return and Risk E. State Dependent Utility F. Subjective Probability Theory Exercises Part II: GAME THEORY Introduction to Part II 7. Basic Elements of Non-Cooperative Games A. Introduction B. What is a Game? C. The Extensive Form Representation of a Game D. Strategies and the Normal Form Representation of a Game E. Randomized Choices Exercises 8. Simultaneous-Move Games A. Introduction B. Dominant and Dominated Strategies C. Rationalizable Strategies D. Nash Equilibrium E. Games of Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium F. The Possibility of Mistakes: Trembling-Hand Perfection Appendix: Existence of Nash Equilibrium Exercises 9. Dynamic Games A. Introduction B. Sequential Rationality, Backwards Induction, and Subgame Perfection C. Sequential Rationality and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs D. Reasonable Beliefs, Forward Induction, and Normal Form Refinements Appendix A: Finite and Infinite Horizon Bilateral Bargaining Appendix B: Extensive Form Trembling-Hand Perfection Exercises Part III: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE Introduction to Part III 10. Competitive Markets A. Introduction B. Pareto Optimality and Competitive Equilibria C. Partial Equilibrium Competitive Analysis D. The Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Partial Equilibrium Context E. Welfare Analysis in the Partial Equilibrium Model F. Free-Entry and Long-Run Competitive Equilibria G. Concluding Remarks on Partial Equilibrium Analysis Exercises 11. Externalities and Public Goods A. Introduction B. A Simple Bilateral Externality C. Public Goods D. Multilateral Externalities E. Private Information and Second-Best Solutions Appendix: Non-Convexities and the Theory of Externalities Exercises 12. Market Power A. Introduction B. Monopoly Pricing C. Static Models of Oligopoly D. Repeated Interaction E. Entry F. The Competitive Limit G. Strategic Precommitments to Affect Future Competition Appendix A: Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem Appendix B: Strategic Entry Deterrence and Accommodation Exercises 13. Adverse Selection, Signalling, and Screening A. Introduction B. Informational Asymmetries and Adverse Selection C. Signalling D. Screening Appendix: Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signalling Games Exercises 14. The Principal-Agent Problem A. Introduction B. Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard) C. Hidden Information (and Monopolistic Screening) D. Hidden Actions and Hidden Information: Hybrid Models Appendix A: Multiple Effort Levels in the Hidden Action Model Appendix B: A Formal Solution of the Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Information Exercises Part IV: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM Introduction to Part IV 15. General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples A. Introduction B. Pure Exchange: The Edgeworth Box C. The One Consumer-One Producer Economy D. The 2x2 Production Model E. General versus Partial Equilibrium Theory Exercises 16. Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare Properties A. Introduction B. The Basic Model and Definitions C. The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics D. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics E. Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Optima F. First-Order Conditions for Pareto Optimality G. Some Applications Appendix: Technical Properties of the Set of Feasible Allocations Exercises 17. The Positive Theory of Equilibrium A. Introduction B. Equilibrium: Definitions and Basic Equations C. Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium D. Local Uniqueness and the Index Theorem E. Anything Goes: The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem F. Uniqueness of Equilibria G. Comparative Statics Analysis H. Tatonnement Stability I. Large Economies and Non-Convexities Appendix A: Characterizing Equilibrium through Welfare Equations Appendix B: A General Approach to the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium Exercises 18. Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria A. Introduction B. Core and Equilibria C. Non-Cooperative Foundations of Walrasian Equilibria D. The Limits to Redistribution E. Equilibrium and the Marginal Productivity Principle Appendix: Cooperative Game Theory Exercises 19. General Equilibrium under Uncertainty A. Introduction B. A Market Economy with Contingent Commodities: Description C. Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium D. Sequential Trade E. Asset Markets F. Incomplete Markets G. Firm Behavior in General Equilibrium Models under Uncertainty H. Imperfect Information Exercises 20. Equilibrium and Time A. Introduction B. Intertemporal Utility C. Intertemporal Production and Efficiency D. Equilibrium: The One-Consumer Case E. Stationary Programs, Interest Rates, and Golden Rules F. Dynamics G. Equilibrium: Several Consumers H. Overlapping Generations I. Remarks on Non-Equilibrium Dynamics: Tatonnement and Learning Exercises Part V: WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES Introduction to Part V 21. Social Choice Theory A. Introduction B. A Special Case: Social Preferences over Two Alternatives C. The General Case: Arrow''s Impossibility Theorem D. Some Possibility Results: Restricted Domains E. Social Choice Functions Exercises 22. Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining A. Introduction B. Utility Possibility Sets C. Social Welfare Functions and Social Optima D. Invariance Properties of Social Welfare Functions E. The Axiomatic Bargaining Approach F. Coalitional Bargaining: The Shapley Value Exercises 23. Incentives and Mechanism Design A. Introduction B. The Mechanism Design Problem C. Dominant Strategy Implementation D. Bayesian Implementation E. Participation Constraints F. Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms Appendix A: Implementation and Multiple Equilibria Appendix B: Implementation in Environments with Complete Information Exercises Mathematical Appendix A. Introduction B. Homogeneous Functions and Euler''s Formula C. Concave and Quasiconcave Functions D. Matrices: Negative (Semi)Definiteness and Other Properties E. The Implicit Function Theorem F. Continuous Functions and Compact Sets G. Convex Sets and Separating Hyperplanes H. Correspondences I. Fixed Point Theorems J. Unconstrained Maximization K. Constrained Maximization L. The Envelope Theorem M. Linear Programming N. Dynamic Programming

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