Description: Why Power Indices and Coalition Formation? M.J. Holler, G. Owen. 1. Refinements and Extensions of Power Indices. An Average Value Function for Cooperative Games; V. Akimov, W. Kerby. Extended Probabilistic Characterization of Power Indices; M. Brueckner. Axiomatics of Level Structure Values; F. Chantreuil. Values for Multialternative Games and Multilinear Extensions; R. Ono. Models and Reality: The Curious Case of the Absent Abstention; D.S. Felsenthal, M. Machover. Global Monotonicity of Values of Cooperative Games: An Argument Supporting the Explanatory Power of Shapley's Approach; R. Levnsky, P. Silrszky. On the Probabilistic Relationship Between the Public Good Index and the Normalized Banzhaf Index; M. Widgrn. A Note on the Holler-Packel Axiomatization of the Public Good Index (PGI); S. Napel. 2. Coalition Formation and Values. Power, Cooperation Indices and Coalition Structures; R. Amer, F. Carreras. Equal Treatment for Both Sides of Assignment Games in the Modified Least Core; P. Sudhlter. On Small Coalitions, Hierarchic Decision Making and Collective Competence; S. Berg. An Axiomatic Approach to Probabilistic Efficient Values for Cooperative Games; T. Radzik, Th. Driessen. Set Games; H. Aarts, et al. 3. Power in European Decision Making. Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures; A. Laruelle, M. Widgrn. Decisiveness and Inclusiveness: Two Aspects of the Intergovernmental Choice of European Voting Rules; T. Knig, T. Bruninger. Calculus of Consent in the EU Council of Ministers; H. Nurmi, et al. Coalition Formation and Voting in the Council of the European Union; M.O. Hosli. Voting Power in the European Central Bank; M. Brueckner.4. Power and Representation. Power Indices and the Design of Electoral/Constitutional Systems; R.J. Johnston. Implementing Democracy in Indirect Voting Processes: the Knesset Case; A. Laruelle. Index of Power for Cabinet; J.W. Mercik.

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