Real federalism requires effective constitutional constraints on the national government. American government lost such constraints -- and hence, real competitive federalism -- some six decades ago, when the traditional constitutional notion of "enumerated" powers collapsed in the wake of the New Deal. It will prove exceedingly difficult to reestablish constitutional constraints, since so many powerful interests have acquired huge stakes in a centralized and essentially unconstrained national government.

In several important decisions (each discussed in this book), the United States Supreme Court has reestablished at least some federalism constraints. At the same time, a loose coalition of "leave-us-alone" constituencies -- including, for example, religious groups, the term limits movement, home school and school choice organizations, and tax limitation initiatives -- have developed a strategic interest in open, decentralized political arrangements. Real Federalism shows that those constituencies and the Supreme Court can, through a "virtuous cycle" of progressive accommodation and (often implicit) cooperation, succeed in advancing federalism.

Real Federalism combines a compelling, jargon-free analysis of important legal decisions and of the Supreme Court's role inmodern American politics with a practical interest in reestablishing constitutional federalism. The book will be of interest not only to lawyers, legal scholars, and political scientists, but also to policymakers and advocates.